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Introduction
In May 2015, Brazil received a delegation from the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) led by the Prime Minister Li Keqian. The immediate result 
was the signing of a Joint Action Plan for the period 2015-2021, composed 
of 35 cooperation agreements2. Several sectors were covered: agriculture and 
livestock; science and technology (S&T); commerce; communications; ener-
gy; sports; infrastructure; environment; planning; and foreign affairs. Proba-
bly the agreement that will require more resources and denser studies refers 
to the rail project, through which it is intended to connect the port of Açu, in 
northern Rio de Janeiro with the one from Ilo, Peru. Their achievement can 
provide the flow of low unit value cargo, such as grain, from the producing 
areas of central-western Brazil to the Chinese ports, such as Shanghai. To this 
end, it has been signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the feasibility 
study for this Transcontinental Railroad Project.
Three other relevant agreements for this article are those concern-
ing: the export of Brazilian livestock products; the financing for the company 
Petróleo Brasileiro Sociedade Anônima - Petrobrás; and the export of iron ore. 
The first allows the resumption of Chinese imports of Brazilian beef through 
the adoption of more accepted rules in the field of animal health. The second 
finances the Brazilian oil company to explore offshore fields under deep wa-
ters. In this case the contribution may be the supply of oil to the PRC, if we 
1  Professor at the Faculdade de Campinas (FACAMP). Gratuated in Naval Sciences at the 
Escola Naval and PhD in Maritime Policy and Strategy at the Escola de Guerra Naval and in Po-
litical Science at the Universidade de São Paulo, in International Relations area. He researches 
Chinese and North-American foreign policies. E-mail: csazv@terra.com.br
2  According to Portal Planalto of 05/20/2015 with an entry dedicated to the expansion of Chi-
nese investment in Brazil.
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take as model the previous agreement signed in 2009: Chinese financing of 
US$ 10 billion and in return the supply of 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 
2009 and 200,000 bpd over the next nine years3. The third agreement con-
cerns the financial and operational cooperation in the mining sector, involv-
ing Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale) and Chinese entities. The total value 
of Chinese investment in the 35 projects is estimated at about US$ 53 billion 
for an unsettled time frame.
It is not trivial to have bilateral agreements with economic reach of 
such magnitude. Regardless of the time period for the maturing of projects, 
the expenditures certainly will happen as different studies show its viability, 
especially the economic. The design of the transcontinental railroad, for ex-
ample, will require cautious environmental impact studies and the prepara-
tion of the following environmental impact reports (EIA). Such studies may 
determine change of originally estimated paths, population transfer (even 
Indian tribes, some not yet studied), and engineering works of art to make 
possible the transposition of broad rivers of the Amazon basin. Considering 
also that the work will be carried out largely in the Amazon biome where, 
according to Diegues (2002, 73) the climate is hot and humid with an average 
annual temperature of 24º Celsius (C) and 26º C and an average annual rain-
fall precipitation between 2000 millimeters (mm) and 3000 mm. These char-
acteristics shall require specific technical solutions for the implementation of 
a secure and stable permanent way, and with a realistic budget.
Although not detailed the financing agreement concerning Petrobras, 
the model adopted by the PRC commits foreign companies to provide oil to 
the PRC in the period that is settled. Visentini (2013, 72) identifies an “An-
golan model” that was adopted by other African states. Also, it is determined 
the compensation in raw materials to the investment made. Following this 
model, the implementation of this agreement on the Petrobrás shall help the 
Chinese to obtain fossil energy for their various purposes. The model imple-
mentation methodology is bureaucratically simple and emphasizes sectors 
such as infrastructure, production and vacancy rate for college students in 
Chinese institutions. According to Brautigam (2009, 11), in the case of infra-
structure works, Chinese aid usually signals with the opening of low-skilled 
job positions for local nationals. The positions that require qualified training 
are destined for the Chinese to the management of the works and the use of 
Chinese machinery and equipment. This is the model adopted by the PRC in 
African countries. Taking in mind the methodology applied in these countries 
3  According to the article Latin America and China’s ‘New Normal’- Analysis, published on the 
Eurasia Review website, and by Patrick Howlett-Martin in his article Chine-Brésil, une aliance 
fragile, published in Monde Chinois.
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that are poorly endowed with industrial parks, would such model be also used 
by the Chinese in Brazil?
In the case of Vale, the continued supply of iron ore to the Chinese 
shall guarantee them the raw materials necessary to maintain the operation 
of its industrial park. And this industrial park requires energy so that the ore 
is processed into various products. The concern of the Chinese government 
with the iron ore supply is not new. Howllet-Martin, in the previously cited 
article, reminds of the Chinese investment in 2005 of US$ 1.5 billion from the 
Baosteel Group in Maranhão; and another one of US$ 3 to US$ 4 billion from 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation to the extension of the 
port of Itaqui, also in Maranhão, along with rail infrastructure to transport soy 
from the states of Piauí and Maranhão. That is, the Chinese initiatives aim 
to provide the regions of interest an appropriate infrastructure for the flow of 
commodities required to meet domestic demand in the PRC. To what extent 
are these initiatives strategically useful to Brazil? To what extent do they differ 
from the other former ones held by Europeans during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries?
This article intends to answer these questions by analyzing the Chi-
nese motivation in search of commodities: grain, oil and iron ore. To do so, it 
will identify data sources that might point to elements that help to explain this 
search. After that, it will be fixed on the recent Chinese government initiatives 
that contribute to the construction of arguments necessary to demonstrate 
the Grand Strategy4 adopted by the PRC in its relations with international 
partners. To this end, it is necessary to identify the Chinese national strategic 
objectives that justify this Grand Strategy. Any Chinese interpretive asym-
metries relating to neighbors will be acknowledged, especially in maritime 
areas. And here, only briefly, will be addressed constraints and partnerships 
experienced by the PRC related to exogenous powers to the region that can 
contribute to the analysis.
Since the political system of the PRC is characterized by a hegemon-
ic party5, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), strategic decisions are taken 
at State level, which is being used as a reference point in this article. It will 
follow, however, a string that favors political realism founded in power. This 
is because the Chinese search for the satisfaction of basic needs - food and 
energy (iron ore depends on energy for processing) - through agreements 
4  Grand strategy can be defined as a “long-term national project dedicated to national security 
aspects”, as in Moura (2014, 112). It appears, therefore, that the grand strategy involves a com-
plex of initiatives linked to national goals vital to the survival of a nation.
5  The term Hegemony means the sense of supremacy of intellectual and moral capacity, in 
reason of the CCP being formally accepted as legitimate guide to the people.
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seeks to commune common interests with partners. Therefore, this quest has 
placed in cooperation a cornerstone to the building of partnerships. After all, 
a politically stable external environment is crucial for the PRC to continue to 
receive vital products for their survival. Cooperation determines reciprocity, 
which usually requires the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers6. The com-
plementarity may be acceptable, even if the cooperation is asymmetric quali-
tatively - for example, manufactured products for commodities. But it may be 
perceived as unacceptable if one side understands that its industrial base is 
neutralized by the partner’s competition. Thus, it motivates the examination 
of the Sino-Brazilian relations. Finally, here are presented the concluding re-
marks.
Genesis of Emergence
The Chinese are an ancient civilization. Chinese history teaches that 
the greatest concerns of the rulers were in the food supply and its distribution 
to the population, besides the territorial protection against neighbors. Con-
fucius7, in the Analects (1997, 91) recommended: “Whoever administrates 
public affairs must ensure that foodstuffs are not lacking, that military forces 
are sufficient and that the people trust him.” Probably, this recommendation 
from Confucius would be related with food shortages that often occurred by 
reason of natural disasters and wars. And, despite being a thinker who cared 
about peace in social relations, he was not unaware of the importance of de-
fense. After all, part of his life corresponds to the Warring States era, between 
403 before Christ (BC) and 221 BC when there were political instability and 
food shortages afflicting the population.
Understandably Swaine and Tellis (2000, x) defend that, throughout 
Chinese history, the Grand Strategy has been pursuing three interrelated stra-
tegic objectives: preservation of domestic order and well-being of the people 
in face of various social constraints; defense against persistent external threats 
to the sovereignty and territorial integrity; and obtain and maintain geopoliti-
cal influence along the extensive border. It can be said that a powerful source 
of social instability is the lack of food. Due to a continuous high quantity 
6  The non-tariff barriers relate to restrictions on international trade, usually taken unilaterally, 
such as import quotas and licenses, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and social or techno-
logical antidumping measures. There is extensive literature on the subject; it may be suggested 
Foschete (2001) and Thorstensen (2001) for objectivity in approach.
7  Confucius would have lived from 551 BC to 479 BC, according to Fairbank and Goldman 
(2006, 64) and Cheng (2008, 65). The last one states that the name Confucius is a latinization 
made by the Jesuits in China from ideograms that have the sound of Konfuzi (Master Kong).
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population, the concern of governments with their food production is special. 
In addition, there is the limitation factor of agricultural land, that is approxi-
mately 12% of the territory of the PRC, from which the total is 9,600,000.5 
square kilometers (km2)8. The arable land is the same for millennia, which 
requires an increasingly more accurate soil management.
Indeed, the analysis from Naughton (2007, 35 et seq.) on the Chinese 
economy between 1127 and 1911 identifies, for part of that period, sophis-
ticated initiatives that resulted in high agricultural productivity. During the 
period, he said, about 90% of the Sinic population lived in rural areas. Thus, 
the production was extensive in hand labor employed in small lots9. The so-
phistication was based on three factors: varieties of selected seeds; organic fer-
tilization; and irrigation. During the Song Dynasty (1127-1279) it was achieved 
a faster growth of rice, so that it would be obtained two or three harvests per 
year per area unit. The organic fertilization employed animal and human ma-
nure, mixed with mud and algae. The irrigation system allowed workers to 
properly control the amount of water, so as to obtain good yields. A network 
of artificial canals was developed to enable efficient distribution of both agri-
cultural inputs and production for public silos. Contours were used in lands 
of irregular topography.
Naughton advances stating that, for 400 years, the Chinese agricultur-
al production system met the domestic demand. He informs that the popula-
tion was 72 million people in 1400 and in 1820 it reached 381 million, which 
corresponds to 32% of the world population. At the time, the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of China was about 1/3 of the world GDP. The quantitative 
increase in population associated with the deterioration of the agricultural 
system over time, because of insufficient maintenance, generated a persis-
tent reduction in the grain supply. The historical concern returned to occupy 
the agenda of governments, at the same time as another factor: the arrival of 
European merchants in the nineteenth century, in besides the Portuguese, 
Spanish and Dutch that already were related to China since the sixteenth 
century. The British, especially, expressed dissatisfaction with the traditional 
cash-and-carry method10 adopted by China, with the payment through silver. 
According to Babones11, since the 20s of the sixteenth century until 1640, the 
Iberian ships carried about 100,000 tons (ton.) of silver to China12. It should 
8  According to the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
9  The lots, as Fairbank and Goldman (op. Cit., 167), have an area of approximately 2428 square 
meters (m2).
10  Cash-and-carry can be traslated as the process of buying goods and cash payment.
11  Article published in Foreign Affairs June 2015.
12  Chinese economy would then be transformed into a monetary economy, based on market, 
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be pointed out that China had not developed an industrial economy13; this 
was only implemented from 1912, already on the Republican period. From 
these observations two partial findings are taken in consideration: the silver 
internalized in China served basically to boost agricultural activities; and the 
Chinese population increase over the last 500 years cannot be attributed to 
industrialization, as it is usually done in the analyses relating to European 
countries.
The Opium Wars are known in history. The sophisticated and proud 
Chinese civilization settled to the Nanjing Treaty of 1842. According to Spence 
(1995, 169), the Treaty stipulated several compensations to the British: the 
Article 3 postulated the transfer of Hong Kong Island to the British “in per-
petuity”. Chinese military forces showed themselves unprepared to deal with 
the weaponry of the European powers and the US. The Middle Kingdom has 
failed to maintain the country’s defense and the integrity of its territory14. It 
can be said that the European presence in the Chinese territory has strongly 
contributed to the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the last in a long list. The proc-
lamation of the Republic of China was in 1911. Most of the nineteenth century 
was of deprivations for the Chinese: restrictions on travel by all urban areas 
and limitations on providing their food. These deprivations help explain the 
growing number of rebellions throughout the nineteenth century.
China experienced a phase of internal dissensions in the decades fol-
lowing the proclamation of the republic. Domestic political division between 
nationalists and communists contributed to weaken the nation. The Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 is milestone which added to the European oc-
cupations of the previous century. The overcome occurred after Japan’s de-
feat in the Second World War, particularly from October 1st, 1949 with the 
inauguration of the Peoples Republic, when the Chinese experienced a new 
political and social stage. It was reaffirmed at the time the determination of 
the leadership to restore the old pride. But the historical concerns about for-
eign invasions proved once again present with the Korean War and in the late 
1960s, with the Sino-Russian border litigation. In agricultural production, 
the initiative of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, in 1958, dismantled the 
Chinese agricultural economy. The result was the generalized lack of food. 
The number of recorded deaths from hunger between 1959 and 1961 varies. 
instead of being a non-monetary based on feudal obligations and exchange.
13  There were rudimentary domestic industrial process for cotton weaving and the benficiation 
of tea and silk.
14  Previous historic episodes are the mongol invasion, that led to the implementation of Yuan 
and Qing dynasty, that was indigenous to Manchuria, a region that was not a part of China 
until 1644.
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Gipouloux (2005, 64) replicates quantities from different sources ranging 
from 16.5 million to 30 million people.
Therefore, the development of a strategy regarding the production 
and distribution of food for a historically high contingent as the Chinese one 
always constituted a preoccupation for the rulers. Eventual disarticulations of 
the agricultural system either by natural effect or caused by wrong measures 
generated hunger; consequently, social constraints.
The challenge of food safety
 Since 1978, with the arrival of the group led by Deng Xiaoping, the 
extraordinary growth of China’s GDP per capita15 allowed the population to 
obtain an increasing purchasing power over the next decades. There is, from 
that date until today, the raise in the purchasing power has been uneven at 
two levels: coastal-inland; and rural-urban. The coastal urban population has 
achieved higher incomes. The four modernizations implemented by Deng 
Xiaoping - agriculture, Science & Technology (S&T), defense and industry 
- were initiated in selected sites on the coast. That is, the process of modern-
ization of the PRC happens in the vicinity of the so-called special economic 
zones (EEZ) nearby the sea. Although the hukou16 is in effect, domestic mi-
gration has become increasing. At the two levels mentioned above, two sets 
of oppositions appeared within the Chinese society: local (permanent hukou) 
x strangers (temporary hukou); and peasants (agricultural hukou) x townspeo-
ple (non-agricultural hukou). These distinctions help to deepen the qualitative 
income difference. The old flat equality sought by Mao was all abandoned. 
But in general, there is increasing purchasing power of the Chinese popula-
tion, both urban and rural17. Yang, in an article published in China Daily of 
04/22/2015, announces that the income of China’s rural population reached 
in 2014 10,489 Yuan (US$ 1,693) and the urban population 29,381 Yuan (US$ 
4,743).
It should be recognized, however, that agricultural modernization 
15  The growth of the GNP from 1978 till 2005 was 8,5% (NAUGHTON, p. 140), 8,7 (Yasheng 
2008, 254); from 2008 till 2013, 8,3, in accordance with the OECD, chapter 5, 2015. Lau (2015) 
indicates a growth of 8,6% from 1978  till 2014.
16  According to Gipouloux (op. cit., 118), it is about a residential record. When this system was 
implemented at the time of Mao Zedong, the person would get food and work only where he 
was registered. Over time, there is less efficiency in its control, as to legions of migrants left the 
field, attracted by better working conditions in the cities.
17  In Gipouloux (op. cit. 216) and Naughton (op. Cit. 210) analysis, between 1978 and 2004, 
the increase in the average income of rural households was 587.2%, and of urban families 
553.9%, prices in reference to 2004.
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achieved good success. The Deng Xiaoping’s initiative to return the historic 
production plant of the field to the family one - revoking the implementation 
of agricultural production with fulcrum in communes - proved successful. 
The mere possibility that households may sell in the markets of the villages 
and towns the surplus delivered to the State increased the Chinese agricultur-
al production. To illustrate this statement, Gipouloux (2007, 70) shows that 
China’s grain production rose from 304.77 million tons in 1978 to 469.47 
million tons in 2004. The Chinese production of cereals in 2014 was esti-
mated at 492.8 metric tons (ton3), according to the US Department of Agri-
culture.18
It is observed, therefore, an accelerated process of urbanization of the 
Chinese people19. However, it should be noted that is not correct to attribute 
the process of urbanization only to rural-urban migration; it is a resulting 
from particular resets on the urban limits determined by population growth 
in the PRC. The first result of this process is the reduction of arable land 
fringes of urban environments, reducing the area of food production. In other 
words, there is competition from three confluent factors putting pressure on 
domestic food production in the PRC: population growth; reducing of planted 
areas; and the increased purchasing power of people, who start to diversify 
their diet20. It reinforces thus the argument that pressures on governments 
to offer food follow a historical line, with the magnitude of the population, in 
2014, of 1.36782 billion, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of the 
PRC.
18  The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) is equivalent to the Brazilian Ministry of Ag-
riculture. The document that informs the value of China’s grain production also notes the 
productions of others: USA, 439.3 tons; India, 238.7 tons; Russia, 100.1 tons; Brazil, 99.1 tons; 
others, 744.2 tons. So for these quantities, Brazil is the fifth largest grain producer in the world. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its 2013-2022 Highlights predicted 478.8 tons for the PRC.
19  This information can be graphically displayed on the United Nations website, on the page 
of Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Through this, it can 
be noticed the intersection of the curves of the rural and urban population in 2015, when the 
population in the cities begins to supplant the rural; it changes, from then on, the Chinese 
historical demographic paradigm.
20  The website of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations show graphics that clearly 
illustrate the search for diversification of food consumption, contemplating higher percentage 
of animal protein.
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The energy security challenge
The modernization of industry constituted virtuous corollary to the 
establishment of the special economic zones. The absorption of new technol-
ogies and processes arising from abroad transformed the PRC in the “world 
factory”. Indeed, the Chinese developed the secondary sector of its economy 
over the past 37 years with unusual efficiency. The Chinese manufactured 
products are found in many different markets. And its quality is gradually 
captivating the consumers. The Chinese manufactured products already com-
pete with other sources not only for the traded prices, but for reliability and 
durability. This was a learning developed from the modernization, already 
cited, guided by Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai and announced by Enlai at 
the Fourth National People’s Congress in January 1975 (Bergère, Bianco and 
Domes 1990, 81; Mazzetti 2000, 81; Marti 2007, 281; Gao 2011, p. 321) and 
practiced in the government of Deng Xiaoping since 1978.
However, the energy matrix of the 70s of the twentieth century, based 
on the intensive use of coal, proved to be increasingly unable to support the 
industrial development of the country. The flexibility of the use of petroleum 
products over the coal began to demand greater domestic oil production. It is 
true that coal is still the most widely used source for generating electricity and 
thermal heating in the interior of the buildings, according to the Energy Infor-
mation Administration of the US government21. But the progressively more 
sophisticated industrial park consumes oil products. Accruing to this, there 
is the increase of transport modes which also consume these products. Cur-
rently, the demand and domestic production curves deviate more and more22. 
According to this source, in 2014, the Chinese oil production was 4.23 million 
bpd, for a consumption of 10.7 bpd. Concerning to the liquefied petroleum 
gas production, in 2013 it was of 4.1 trillion cubic meters (tcm) compared to 
the consumption of 5.7 tcm.
The solution sought by the PRC government has been importing oil 
and gas. Three regions are suppliers to the RPC: Middle East and Central 
Asia (including Russia); Africa; and South America. The Chinese leaders have 
diversified, thus, the sources of supply in these three regions. In 2014, the 
largest oil suppliers, in percentages, were: Saudi Arabia (16%), Angola (13%), 
Russia (11%), Oman (10%), Iran and Iraq (9%), United Arab Emirates and 
Venezuela (4%), Colombia and Kuwait (3%), and Brazil, Congo, South Sudan 
21  US Energy Information Administration. The analysis presented in the report, from May 
2015, shows that 65% of the energy consumed in the PRC comes from the coal.
22  Idem.
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and Kazakhstan (2%); other vendors complete the remaining 10%23. A partial 
conclusion emerges from this Chinese search for fossil fuels abroad: there is 
a potential vulnerability face of the eventual political instability in some pro-
ducing region; and there is difficulty in providing security to the supply lines 
of varying lengths.
The main modes of imported oil and gas transportation by the PRC 
are pipelines and maritime waterways. The pipelines connect the producing 
countries of Central Asia and Russia to the PRC. Most of the suppliers coun-
tries of oil and gas are part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
This organization brings together Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the PRC, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Extended oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia 
and Russia are linked to the existing ones inside the PRC. The Organization 
reinforces the political and commercial ties with the member countries. It is 
an essential instrument to contribute to the energy security in the PRC, since 
it comprises the maintenance of political stability in the region. After all, the 
States accompanying the PRC in the Organization were part of the former 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); still, there is a special bond of 
those countries located in Central Asia with Russia. Through SCO, the RPC 
is also able to project its influence on Central Asia.
Maritime waterways - or sea lines of communication (SLOC) - feature 
two vulnerabilities for RPC: extension; and bottlenecks, or choke points. They 
are: the Bab el Mandeb Strait, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden; 
the Strait of Hormuz, between the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea; and 
the Malacca Strait that connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. 
According to the US Department of Defense, using the Annual Report to 
Congress, referring to the military development and security in the PRC, year 
2014, 82% of all the oil and 30% of all the gas that transits the Indian Ocean 
towards the South China Sea (SCS) passes through Malacca. An interruption 
in that strait would force ships to cross one of the two southernmost passages 
in Indonesia, Lombok or Sunda, an increase of about three days on the jour-
ney. If these passages are also blocked, the ships would have to get all around 
Australia, with an average increase of fifteen days in transit. This would result 
in augmented costs in the transport of cargo and its insurance.
A Chinese initiative to mitigate the vulnerability in the Malacca Strait 
was the partnership with Myanmar: a set of pipelines carrying oil and gas 
from the coast of the latter to the Chinese province of Yunan. Consequently, 
the Chinese ships transfer cargo to the facilities in Myanmar coast without 
requiring to transit through the Strait. Through domestic pipelines, the PRC 
23  US Energy Information Administration.
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distributes the raw products or some already benefited in the provinces’ re-
fineries for the whole territory. Another Chinese initiative is in the agreement 
with Pakistan: the RPC fits the port of Gwadar to receive oil and gas cargo 
ships and then transport it by pipeline to the PRC. It would, once again, pre-
vented the Indonesian passages, that can be easily blocked by opposing mili-
tary forces or navigation accidents.
The RPC also uses the SLOC to import iron ore, critical to its industry. 
The domestic production reached 1.32 billion tons in 2013, while the Aus-
tralian, in the same year, reached 530 million tons, and the Brazilian, 386.27 
million tons that year, according to the summary of the Brazilian National 
Department of Mineral Production, elaborated by the technician Carlos de 
Jesus. However, according to him, Brazil may be the second largest producer 
if considered the average content of iron ore, i.e., the amount of ore obtained 
in a ton of extracted material. Consistent with this criterion, the real Chinese 
production would be of 390 million tons. It is explained, thus, China’s hunger 
for imported iron ore, particularly from Australia and Brazil.
Chinese defense forces
To ensure the supply of imported oil and gas, the PRC has been devel-
oping its defense industry. To the extent that domestic energy supplies need 
increase, imports grow. The Report to Congress mentioned above analyzes the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC in their naval, ground and air as-
pects. With an official budget of US$ 136.3 billion24, the PLA seeks to provide 
itself with the means to contribute to China’s energy security. After all, these 
days, the historical Chinese concerns about the invasions of the surrounding 
barbarians transformed to the permanent concern about the availability of 
energy supplies for its industrial park and transport. Therefore, it is about the 
PRC’s attention to avoid possible restrictions on oil and gas imports.
It should be noted, however, the distinction between the operational-
ization of the security of land supply lines from Central Asia and the SLOC. 
The pipelines run by territories belonging to almost all the members of the 
SCO. In this case, it can be said that security is achieved through this Organ-
ization; the responsibilities assumed by its members connotes the inference 
that Chinese security in the supply of oil and gas lies in this institutional envi-
ronment. A partial conclusion is that the energy transport through pipelines 
does not require permanent ready use of military force. The institutional en-
24  It is worth noting that the official quantitative budget is supplemented by revenue from 
non-military activities, such as, for example, investments in hotels and in telephone companies 
belonging to the military forces.
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vironment provided by SCO points firstly to the use of non-military Chinese 
instruments in case there are any problems in Central Asia.
In the case of the SLOC, the characteristics and degree of protection 
imply the PLA contribution. States that coast the SCS have different postures 
towards the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)25, 
also known as the Convention of Jamaica, from December 10th, 198226. Con-
vention is an important international regime, but the initiatives of some States 
in the region show that the environment in the SCS is instable. By the SLOC 
of that sea transit carriers which demand to the ports of different countries of 
Southeast Asia and the Far East. Concerning the PRC, 85% of all imported oil 
and 33% of all gas pass through their SLOC, according to the aforementioned 
Annual Report to the US Congress in 2014. And there are confirmed oil re-
serves, especially in the vicinity of Paracel and Spratly archipelagos.
Although the PRC has ratified the Convention on June 7th, 1996 
(Austin 1998, 54 et seq.), Beijing has insisted that the PRC has sovereignty27 
over most of the SCS. The claimed sovereignty is based on history. According 
to Austin, the cartographic survey during the trips of the Chinese admiral 
Zheng He in the 15th century would be argument to validate such claim. The 
research of Pinotti (2015, 43) suggests that the Chinese demand for sovereign-
ty in the SCS had an earlier origin, on the Chinese Xia dynasty, that ruled be-
tween 2100 BC and 1600 BC. Pinotti also asserts that Vietnam evokes history 
to defend sovereignty over the Paracel and the Spratly. It should be noted that 
Vietnam also ratified the UNCLOS, on July 25th, 1994, according to the UN 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea28.
Other coastal states to the SCS also rival the PRC regarding to that 
sea. The claims based on history challenge the observation of UNCLOS. And 
the sovereignty claimed by those is cause of disputes that generate frequent 
frictions with the PRC.  But the Convention suggests peaceful ways to resolve 
disputes, especially in Articles 287 and 298. The PRC stated on August 25th 
2006 that it keeps its interpretation on the sovereignty of the Paracel and 
Spratly archipelagos’ islands as it is in the document of the Division of Ocean 
Affairs cited above. In fact, the UNCLOS suggests that disputes concerning 
25  United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
26 The UNCLOS came into force on November 16th 1994, as it is in Art. 1 of Presidential 
Decree No. 1530 of June 22th 1995. This Decree also states that Brazil ratified the Convention 
on December 22th 1988.
27  The term sovereignty used in this article is of the Westphalian type, a concept presented by 
Krasner (1999, 9) to mean that the decisions of the domestic authorities do not accept influ-
ence of external actors on area only subject to national laws.
28  Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.
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the overlapping of maritime areas need to be addressed at first bilaterally; if 
there is no agreement, independent instances should be consulted as set out 
in the Art 287 of the Convention. Accordingly the UNCLOS guides the parties 
to resolve their disputes by peaceful means. But frictions have been noted. 
Only in 2014, the PRC generated tensions with the Philippines because of 
the presence of nationals of both at the Spratley, in particular in the so-called 
Second Thomas shallows. With Malaysia, the litigation is due to the shallows 
Reed Bank, near Borneo. And with Vietnam, in the same year, the Depart-
ment of Defense Report to the US Congress, in 2015, counts nine tensioned 
events in the Paracel.
In addition to the coastal States of the SCS, the PRC experiences dis-
comfort with the US. The US Congress has not ratified UNCLOS. Besides, 
the US maintains military agreements with countries in the region, as the 
Republic of Korea and Japan. They are two more oil importers using almost 
exclusively the SLOC from the SCS for transportation. The presence of US 
Navy ships and aircraft in its waters has generated tensions in the region. The 
report cited in the previous paragraph mentions a People Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) fighter plane which intercepted a maritime patrol aircraft of the 
US Navy, putting both at risk conditions.
Another State which appears on the SCS is Russia. The Russian Navy 
uses the SLOC in that sea so that its ships can transit between the bases of 
Sebastopol, in the Crimea, and Vladivostok in the far east part of the country. 
The deputy defense minister of Russia said in Singapore on May 30th this 
year that its Navy will participate in naval exercises in the SCS in 2016, with 
the Brunei Navy. Reportedly, he stressed that the existence of the Russian navy 
in those waters is to mark its presence, show its flag and thus counteract the 
presence of the US Navy. The minister also said that the US adopts policies 
contrary to Russia and the PRC29. The Russian presence in the SCS cannot 
be seen as a threat. The PRC is an importer of Russian military technology. 
The Navy of the PLA (PLAN) and the Air Force of the PLA (PLAAF) have Rus-
sian-made aircraft in its inventory30 and Mizokami (2015) reports the acqui-
sition of new submarines of the Yasen class by the PRC from Russia. So, the 
PRC depends, in part, on the acquisition of Russian defense material.
The SCS is, thus, important for the countries of the region. The SLOC 
vital for them, the prospect of oil and gas exploration, and fishing, food supply 
to the Asian populations, enhance the interest of all for therein waters and 
islands. The PRC aligns the PLA as a tool to use in this sea area if necessary. 
29  News published on the Sputnik news website.
30  There is extensive literature on the subject. It can be accessed the article by Felix Chang in 
the Foreign Policy Research Institute page.
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And the naval arm, i.e., the PLAN is the most suitable to operate in the sea, 
backed by the aircraft when necessary. Thus, PLAN has three squadrons which 
bases are: the Northern Fleet in Qingdao, the nearest of Beijing; the Eastern 
in Dinghai; and the Southern in Zhan Jiang, opposite to the island province 
of Hainan. Nuclear submarines are concentrated in the Northern Fleet; the 
others have conventional submarines. The squadrons also have frigates, de-
stroyers, ships proper to launch Marines ashore, and patrol ships equipped 
with missiles. The PLAN still has in their inventory an aircraft carrier. It has 
worked so far in order to successfully integrate the ship-aircraft binomial.
The terrestrial part of the PLA has its major units stationed in the 
east and middle east of the country. This placement follows from the lesser 
concern with threats originating from the neighboring states. On the domes-
tic level, the eastern region has the largest economic wealth in the PRC, both 
industrial and agricultural - the agricultural lands are located east and south 
- and the majority of the population is in that part of the territory. The habit-
ual discourse targets the island of Taiwan, considered by Beijing as a rebel 
province. Shudders are increasingly sparingly, probably due to more intense 
dialogue of authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The positioning of 
ground forces in the eastern part of the country still reflects long-standing 
concern with possible strengthening of the Japanese defense forces.
The PLAAF, just as the land side, has its bases located in the east. 
The concerns that guide this positioning are the same for ground forces. The 
PLAAF aircraft tune their operations with those of PLAN, which bases are 
located in the vicinity of the stations. The PLAAF is prepared to support naval 
operations over a part of the SCS and its closest rival the is Air Force of the 
Republic of China, i.e. Taiwan. The local air superiority over the Strait, even 
nowadays, belongs to the island’s Air Force. It starts from the assumption that 
any invasion of Taiwan could only start from the sea; hence, the difficulty for 
attackers would rest on the actions of the island’s airspace. There is discreet 
US logistical support to the military forces of Taiwan, according to Taiwan 
Relation Act, from April 1979.
It can be stated that, from the PLA strands, the PLAN has, in fact, the 
greatest responsibility for the provision, by the government, of food and ener-
gy security. The nearby SLOC crossing disputed areas, such as the SCS, and 
the ones outside this sea, increasingly extensive, show that the Navy has to be 
prepared to defend the interests of the PRC and the security dimensions. It 
is not without reason that there is a more intense effort to provide the PLAN 
of naval and air-naval means for the mission. The engagement of PLAN in 
protecting the SLOC that run along the East African coast against pirates, 
nearby the African Horn, is a way to train the trimmings to perform more 
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complex tasks. The hypothesis that a Chinese naval base should be installed 
in Djibouti can be an indication of the distant support expansion. Visits to 
countries bordering the South Atlantic, with long journeys and stays in the 
sea strengthen the argument.
Also in the field of defense, it should be remembered that the ter-
restrial nuclear inventory is the responsibility of the Second Artillery Force. 
There are the conventional missile of 200 kilometers (km) range that protect 
the Chinese territory, to those who reach 3300 km reaching all the Indonesian 
islands, much of India, Iran, Russia and the Bering Strait. Also included, bal-
listic intercontinental missiles which ranges are from 1750 km to 13000 km, 
covering up to South America. Of course, this entire nuclear device has these 
ranges in project. It is of fundamental importance the control of these missile 
systems which reliability is unknown. Equally, there is no reliable informa-
tion on the range of design, design and local manufacture of all components.
Xi Jinping’s strategic project
Xi Jinping is aware of the food and energy import dependency to meet 
the domestic demand in the PRC. Their interpretation of the term “securi-
ty” approaches the understanding of Barry Buzan apud Mutimer (1999, 79). 
Buzan decomposes security in five dimensions: military; political; economic; 
social; and environmental. One can prove this statement with the speech of 
the Chinese president at the first meeting of the National Security Council, 
on April 15th 2014 (XI Jinping 2014, 242). The title is suggestive: “Persisting 
in a holistic view of national security and developing national security with 
Chinese characteristics”. He states that
we must persist in a holistic view of national security, having the security 
of the people, the political security and the economic security as a princi-
ple, essential point and base, respectively. We also need to take military, 
cultural and social security as a guarantee, supporting us in promoting 
international security and opening a national security road with Chinese 
characteristics.
And further, Xi Jinping reinforces his arguments recommending to 
“establish a national security system that integrates the political, territorial, 
military, economic, cultural, social, scientific and technological security of re-
sources and nuclear energy.” Considering the range of security dimensions 
pictured by Xi Jinping, the economic one provides conditions so that, for ex-
ample, military and social security can be obtained. That is, the guarantee of 
food and energy imports depends on economic security. But without military 
Reflections on the Chinese Emergence
180 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.4, n.7, Jan./Jun. 2015 
security, even with economic security, the PRC could experience constraints 
to ensure the satisfaction of domestic demand complemented by imports, 
especially products transported by sea. Indeed, security dimensions are inter-
dependent.
It is reasonable, then, the development of PLA, especially of its navy. 
In the Party-state political system, Xi’s statement31 is emblematic: “We should 
adopt as top priority the ideological and political education so the conception 
of the absolute Party leadership over the armed forces takes root in the minds 
of the officers and soldiers.” And further asserts “It is necessary to strengthen 
Party building in the military, ensuring the Party’s command over the troops 
in the ideological, political and organizational sense.” Those relating to mil-
itary decisions are the responsibility of the Party Central Committee and the 
Central Military Commission. The mission of the PLA is to defend the coun-
try and the CCP. Xi Jinping’s speeches accurately reflect the design of the 
Chinese political system.
The idealization of the Silk Route was presented by Xi Jinping32 in 
2013. In September, he introduced the Economic Belt of the Silk Road, in a 
speech at the Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan. It does not fail to empha-
size the strengthening of mutual trust provided by the SCO. This Economic 
Belt therefore aims to contribute so the pipelines that transport oil and gas 
to the PRC are not affected. Also in 2013, in October, Xi spoke at the Indone-
sian National Congress suggesting the joint construction of the Maritime Silk 
Route in the 21st Century.33 The institutional reference on which the construc-
tion would rely would be the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASE-
AN)34. In other words, institutional instruments - SCO and ASEAN - would 
offer legitimacy to the Chinese multinational policy; but in order to contribute 
to ensuring food and energy security. It can be said that the Sea Route will not 
be limited to the SCS, but will extend to the Indian and Atlantic Ocean.
As an infrastructure financing source in the regions of interest, in 
line with the Sea Route, it was created the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank and the New Development Bank of the BRICS35. The first may help the 
PRC to create links in the ASEAN +1 configuration. And it will assist to alle-
31  Xi Jinping op. cit. p. 262.
32  Idem, p.345.
33  Ibidem, p. 351.
34  ASEAN is a free trade zone, with a vocation for the common market, which comprises 
Brunei, Cambodia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Vietnam.
35  Acronym created by Jim O’Neill, English economist at Goldman Sachs, to refer to Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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viating the litigation in SCS, where there are interests related to oil explora-
tion, fishing and monitoring of maritime traffic. The New Bank of BRICS will 
foster the implementation of useful infrastructure projects in the outflow of 
raw materials of the PRC’s interest in African and Ibero-American countries. 
And the PLAN is being strengthened to contribute to protecting the SLOC of 
interest to the PRC, even the most extensive.
It can be affirmed, therefore, that the two Silk Routes constitute the 
strategic objectives of the PRC; and the Grand Strategy for achieving these 
goals is based positively: on the SCO for the vast land area of Central Asia; 
and on the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the 
Bank of BRICS to further meet the Chinese necessities on the transporta-
tion by sea. The strength of the establishment of agreements and the speed 
with which the Chinese investments enable the infrastructure works seem to 
demonstrate a determination to Beijing in maintaining internal satisfaction 
without any prevarication. The CCP certainly comprehends nowadays the his-
torical challenges of previous rulers of the Middle Kingdom. And President 
Xi Jinping knows his Grand Strategy must provide instruments for the PRC’s 
partners to commune with an essentially cooperative dialogue. This is vital 
for the PRC.
The Sino-Brazilian Relations
 Brazil and PRC established diplomatic relations on August 15th, 1974 
(Cervo and Bueno, 2002, 425). The concept of diplomacy adopted by the Bra-
zilian government was called “responsible diplomacy.” This concept, accord-
ing to Oliveira (2005, 149), “started to be designed as a pragmatic, ecumenical 
and responsible”, i.e., with the non-interference in others’ affairs, seeking 
to observing the international situation as it presented itself, and depositing 
liability in ethics. The concept also directed the opening of diplomatic rela-
tions of our country with many newly independent countries, among them 
the former Portuguese colonies. In this occasion, it was recaptured a vocation 
manifested in Jânio da Silva Quadros government, when the Foreign Minis-
ter Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas fixed the concept of independent 
foreign policy (IFP, or PEI in Portuguese). Nowadays, both policies have a 
South-South version.
Despite being in the cold war, the scope of the establishment of the 
Brazil-PRC relations proved to be successful. After all, the two states share 
foreign policy principles closely. Cabral (2010, 195) says that Brazil defends 
the principles of self-determination, equality and mutual benefits between 
states, independence, non-intervention and national sovereignty. From its 
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side, the PRC emphasizes the “Five Principles of Coexistence”, i.e. peaceful 
coexistence, equality and mutual benefit, non-aggression, non-intervention 
in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty and integrity. So, there are ob-
jective conditions for the two countries to deepen their relations because they 
use a diplomatic language guided by similar principles.
Over time, it was instituted the China-Brazil Business Council 
(2004); in 2006, the China-Brazil Commission of High Level of Agreement 
and Cooperation (COSBAN); the Strategic Dialogue (2007); and in 2008 it 
was created the Financial Dialogue Brazil-China and the China Agenda for 
the commercial area. The developments have been occurring with increasing 
speed, according to mutual interests and the emerging opportunities. The 
creation of the aforementioned Bank of BRICS is an important financing vec-
tor and can leverage initiatives in different fields, such as infrastructure, S&T 
and implementation of new industrial plants. Possibly it will contribute to 
boosting ventures as the factory of the Brazilian Aeronautics Company (EM-
BRAER) installed in the PRC and developing new versions of China Brazil 
Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS).
But it is in the commercial field that a greater asymmetry between 
the two countries can be verified. According to the Ministry of Foreign Re-
lations, Brazil was the 17th destination of Chinese exports between January 
and September 2014, totaling US$ 37 billion and the seventh in the origin 
and source of imports from the PRC, with US$ 40 billion in same period. 
The asymmetry lies not just in the amounts involved or the balance/deficit. 
The source of concern of the Brazilian government and the national private 
sector is in qualitative asymmetry of the trade agenda. The level of technology 
inherent to the products points to a sharp primarism of the items exported 
by Brazil. The result is the shrinking of the national industrial sector in the 
face of competition with Chinese products. The tables below show these trade 
relations between both countries.
Main products sold to the PRC, in millions of US dollars, January - 
September 2014. (continues)
 Description 2013 Value 2013 part. % in total
2014 (jan./
set.) value
2014 part. % 
in total
Soybeans and 
seeds 17.148 37,3% 16.616 40,9%
Ores 16.394 35,6% 12.709 31,3%
Fuels 4.035 8,85% 3.474 8,6%
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Wood pulps 1.582 3,4% 1.711 4,2%
Sugar 1.433 3,1% 880 2,2%
Furs 643 1,45 826 2,05%
Iron and Steel 597 1,3% 530 1,3%
Meats 446 1,0% 521 1,3%
Fat and oils 625 1,45% 421 1,0%
Tobacco and 
substitutes 454 1,05% 334 0,8%
Source: MRE/DPR/DIC based on data from MDIC/SECEX.
 
Main products imported from the PRC, in millions of US dollars, January 
- September 2014.
Description 2013 Value 2013 part. % in total
2014 (jan./
set.) value
2014 part. % 
in total
Electrical 
Machinery 10.869 29,15% 10.898 29%
Mechanical 
Machinery 8.132 21,85% 7.151 19,1%
Organic chemicals 2.184 5,9% 2.232 6,0%
Iron and Steel 978 2,6% 1.388 3,7%
Plastics 1.006 2,7% 1.070 2,9%
Cars 1.034 2,8% 1.002 2,7%
Iron and steel 




884 2,4% 935 2,5%
Man-made 
filaments 745 2,05% 809 2,2%
Precision tools 789 2,15% 780 2,1%
Source: MRE/DPR/DIC based on data from MDIC/SECEX.
Is it true that the modernization of the Brazilian countryside demand-
ed better training of hand labor and technological sophistication and better 
management in the trade of Brazilian commodities. The harvest mechaniza-
tion implied, on the other hand, the quantitative reduction of rural workers. 
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But the displayed tables show that the list of Brazilian imports of manufac-
tured competes with and presses our industry. It is about this the challenge 
set a few years ago for the Brazilian government-private initiative binomial. 
Chinese manufactured occupy a wide range of products, from simple home 
appliances to automobiles. The sophistication of our agricultural production 
and ore mining brought to the Chinese represents two-thirds of the export 
basket; and the agricultural product is practically one.
Final Thoughts
The existence of a reasonably sophisticated industrial sector in Brazil 
points to a differentiation in relations with the PRC in comparison to those 
that the Chinese exercise with African states. The Angolan model, which was 
adopted by other countries from that continent, is not suitable for our country. 
We cannot regress to a status quo ante, from the nineteenth century and the 
early decades of the last century, when it was said that Brazil was a country 
of agricultural vocation. The infrastructure was installed aiming at the export 
of primary goods. The injection of Chinese resources in the execution of pro-
jects that include export of primary goods seems a throwback. We know this 
to be of direct interest to the PRC, in view of its shortcomings. The Chinese 
government has shown that it has clear strategic national goals and pursues a 
Grand Strategy to achieve these goals.
The development of initiatives in the Brazilian infrastructure has to 
commune interests of both sides. It is not reasonable that they have as their 
main purpose the transport of commodities. Even the Chinese example of 
the past, when the exported products did not generate industrial progress, 
should - kept the distance of time – be aware of what is happening today in 
Brazil. The PRC will seek what it needs backed in cooperation. Therefore, it 
is interesting to extend the Brazilian horizon to uncover the diversification 
of the agenda in our relationship with the Chinese. It seems clear that it will 
require a Herculean effort to cover the technological gap, so that we reduce 
the imbalances that we observe face towards the Chinese. Within the cooper-
ative environment, we must be creative in order to balance the quality of the 
relations in different dimensions.
Evidence shows that the PRC needs to be cooperative, in a not always 
stable international environment. The Chinese search for exercising sover-
eignty over disputed maritime areas explains the care of the CPC in develop-
ing the PLA, especially the PLAN. Indeed, the search for food and energy is 
more complex because of distance. In the South Atlantic environment, it is 
believable to infer the future presence of PLAN ships. There is a cooperative 
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exercise of the PRC with African states and South American countries. But it 
must recognize that there are some differences of analysis between the PRC 
and the US, as seen in the SCS. The development of any instability in the 
South Atlantic is not useful to the PRC or to Brazil. Given the proximity of the 
guiding principles of both foreign policies, within the South-South relations, 
it is useful that we anticipate in order to avoid disputes in the region. It is a 
task to be performed by diplomacy.
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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the fundamental challenges perceived by the People’s Republic 
of China: food security and energy security. They become evident through the higher 
demand over the domestic production. This relation compels the Chinese Commu-
nist Party to establish agreements with other countries to balance the supply and 
demand. The People’s Republic of China’s tools put in use to secure the agreements 
are institutional and military. Military tools are necessary to exercise the Chinese sov-
ereignty over the South China Sea, and to keep safe the sea-lanes of communication. 
Consequently, the PRC-Brazil relations are examined, especially the latest.
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